Naturalistic fallacy

Coined by philosopher G.E. Moore in “Principia Ethica” (1903), from Latin "natura." Moore argued that “good” is a simple, indefinable property, so any attempt to equate it with a natural feature commits a fallacy. The name is often loosely stretched to cover related errors.

  1. noun phrase · /NACH-er-uh-LIS-tik FAL-uh-see/

    The mistake of defining moral goodness in terms of some natural property, such as what is pleasant, desired, or evolutionarily useful.

    A precise error in ethical reasoning — treating “good” as if it just meant a factual quality — that is easy to commit and hard to notice.

    Arguing that because a behavior is “natural” it must be morally acceptable commits the naturalistic fallacy.

    Frequently conflated with the appeal to nature, which claims that natural equals good, and with Hume’s is–ought problem; Moore’s point is narrower and definitional — that goodness cannot be reduced to any factual property at all.